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COLOUR VISION AND SEEING COLOURS 
WILL DAVIES 
Abstract 
Colour vision plays a foundational explanatory role in the philosophy of colour, and serves as 
perennial quarry in the wider philosophy of perception. I present two contributions to our 
understanding of this notion. The first is to develop a constitutive approach to characterising 
colour vision. This approach seeks to comprehend the nature of colour vision qua 
psychological kind, as contrasted with traditional experiential approaches, which prioritise 
descriptions of our ordinary visual experience of colour. The second contribution is to argue 
that colour vision does not constitutively involve the ability to see colours, in a natural and 
categorically committed sense. I argue that two subjects exactly alike in respect of their 
constitutive colour vision abilities could differ in respect of whether or not they have 
categorical perception of colour. The argument is supported by thought experiment and 
dissociations observed in cognitive neuropsychology. The argument also bears connections to 
recent neo-Whorfian accounts of colour categorisation. 
1. Introduction 
2. Colour Vision, Experience, and Natures 
3. The Central Argument 
3.1. Colour constancy and discrimination 
3.2. Dissociating colour vision and categorical perception for colour 





What does colour vision, by virtue of its nature, enable us to see? A straightforward answer is 
that colour vision enables us to see colours. What does this mean? Another straightforward 
answer is that ‘seeing colours’, at least in humans, means seeing red, orange, yellow, green, 
blue, and so on. So far, so simple. 
Things are not quite so simple, however. The most natural reading of ‘seeing red, 
orange, and yellow’ is categorically committed, in that it implies the ability to see, in a sense 
not yet explained, the colour categories red, orange, and yellow. Thus understood, the ability 
to see colours implies the possession of categorical perception for colour (CP). CP is a vivid 
feature of our ordinary experience of colour, as canonically manifested in the banded or 
segmented appearance of a rainbow. Colour category terms such as ‘red’, and derivatives 
such as ‘reddish’ and ‘shade of red’, also provide our primary means of communicating about 
colour and colour vision. Despite the experiential vividness and communicative 
pervasiveness of colour categories, however, I believe that colour vision should be 
dissociated from CP for colour. Our normal human visual ability to perceive colour has a 
constitutive nature that is distinct from that of our ability for colour categorisation. To put the 
claim in its most provocative form, colour vision does not, by its nature, confer the ability to 
see colours, in the natural, categorically committed, sense. 
The central argument is as follows. It is constitutive of possessing colour vision that 
an organism possesses the ability to achieve colour constancy; colour constancy is 
characterised by abilities to discriminate visually between both the surface spectral 
reflectance properties of objects and wavelength properties of the ambient illumination; it is 
possible that colour constancy qua SSR and wavelength discrimination, hence colour vision, 
could be completely dissociated from CP for colour; therefore, CP for colour does not form 
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part of the nature of our colour vision abilities. This argument will be presented in Section 3. 
The rationale behind the argument’s focus on the constitutive nature of colour vision will be 
discussed in Section 2. 
In Section 4, I provide further motivation for the key dissociative premise of the 
argument by discussing some fascinating cases from cognitive neuropsychology. In cases of 
optic aphasia for colours, subjects retain normal visual discriminatory abilities with respect to 
colour while becoming severely impaired in their performance on colour categorisation tasks. 
In the evocative phrase of Goldstein and Gelb ([1918]), such subjects have an ‘impairment of 
the categorical attitude’ towards colour. These cases suggest that the dissociative possibility 
on which the argument rests is not only coherent, but perhaps not even that distant. I shall 
also bring out some connections between my argument and recent neo-Whorfian views of 
colour categorisation in cognitive psychology, on which CP is taken to be partly influenced 
by linguistic colour classification. While the argument is strictly independent of these 
contentious empirical issues, the discussion should present fruitful new points of contact 
between philosophical and scientific work on colour perception. 
 
2. Colour Vision, Experience, and Natures 
My central theses are, first, that colour constancy is constitutive of colour vision, and second, 
that CP for colour does not form part of this constitutive nature. Two preliminary questions 
arise: Why the interest in colour vision? And why the emphasis on the constitutive nature of 
colour vision? As for the first question, colour vision plays a foundational explanatory role in 
the philosophy of colour. Although not always made explicit, colour vision is assumed to 
provide a privileged source of evidence about colour ontology, surely the central issue in this 
area. This assumption has roots in Aristotle’s claim that colour is the ‘special object’ of 
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vision, by which he meant that it is impossible to acquire knowledge of colour via any other 
sense modality. In contemporary philosophy, a pervasive and related thought is that in order 
to know what colour properties are, we must first understand how colours are represented in 
visual perception.1 Debates about colour ontology therefore have centred on the question as 
to which properties (and relations) are represented in colour vision and whether or not these 
properties (relations) correspond to genuine properties (relations) of the ordinary objects that 
we perceive. Such questions, among other things, have prompted significant interest in colour 
vision within the wider philosophy of perception. Colour vision serves as the go-to source of 
examples in this area, a perennial quarry for philosophers seeking to clarify the nature of 
perception and consciousness. 
The philosophical project of understanding colour vision clearly overlaps significantly 
with work in vision science. Reassuringly, the last twenty five years or so has seen a 
remarkable increase in philosophical engagement with results from physiological, 
psychophysical, and computational studies of colour vision. While increasingly empirically 
informed, however, it nonetheless remains extremely common, if not standard, in 
philosophical contexts to adopt a broadly pre-theoretical, experiential, conception of colour 
vision, at least as a starting point for debate. On this experiential view, colour vision is 
characterised by our having conscious visual experiences of this distinctive type, or by 
objects appearing in these distinctive ways in experience, where the demonstratives are 
intended to pick out aspects or qualitative dimensions of our visual experience that are clearly 
distinguishable from those aspects corresponding to our experience of shape, texture, motion, 
and so on. As a foundation for work in the philosophy of perception, the experiential 
conception licenses an approach to debates about perceptual natures, abilities, constancies, 
and contents that is thoroughly phenomenological and introspective in flavour. As a 
1 See Boghossian and Velleman ([1991], p. 106), Byrne & Hilbert ([2003], p. 5), Hilbert ([1992], p. 359), 
Jackson & Pargetter ([1987], p. 68), and Strawson ([1979], p. 109). 
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foundation for ontology, the experiential view implies that theories of colour ultimately 
should be answerable to features of our ordinary visual experience of colour. A prima facie 
sufficient reason to reject some account of colour ontology, then, would be that it fails to 
recover or respect some aspect of ordinary conscious colour appearances. Such is the current 
and historical orthodoxy in the philosophy of colour.2 
The foregoing characterisation of the experiential view of colour vision probably 
won’t ring true for everyone. Nonetheless, I believe it comes close enough to capturing some 
dominant philosophical tendencies to serve as a target in what follows. The central 
methodological aim of this paper is to develop an alternative to this orthodox experiential 
approach. My proposal is that our philosophical starting point instead should be an account of 
the nature of colour vision qua psychological kind. The kind in question will be a type of 
ability or capacity: colour vision is an ability that subjects possess and that is exercised when 
they visually perceive colours, much as your ability to understand English is a capacity that is 
being exercised while reading this sentence. In seeking an account of the nature of colour 
vision, then, we seek a characterisation of this distinctive psychological ability; an ability 
shared in common between all actual and possible colour perceivers. I call this the 
constitutive approach to theorising about colour vision. 
Thus stated, the constitutive approach is in fact consistent with a certain type of 
experiential view of colour vision. An advocate of the experiential view might endorse the 
constitutive approach and yet persist in claiming that colour vision qua psychological kind 
constitutively involves the ability to undergo this and that type of visual experience.3 For 
reasons that will become clear in the next paragraph, I think that any such constitutive-cum-
2 Some randomly chosen examples of the experiential orthodoxy in action: Armstrong ([1987], pp. 36-37), 
Boghossian & Velleman ([1989], p. 85), McGinn ([1996], pp. 541-542), Tye ([2000], pp. 152-153). Armstrong 
([1978], p. 125) notes that this approach has roots in Hume, for whom colour ‘phenomenology decides the 
question of ontology’. See Akins & Hahn ([2000], p. 233) and Matthen ([2005], p. 167 ff) for discussion. 
3 The approach is likewise consistent with the view that CP for colour is partly constitutive of colour vision. The 
force of my argument lies in its denial of this possibility. 
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experiential view would be extremely implausible. The key point for now is simply that 
unlike mainstream philosophical approaches, the constitutive approach does not force or 
require an experiential conception of colour vision. On the constitutive approach, a 
philosophical account of colour vision is not beholden to, or necessarily constrained by, 
features of our ordinary colour experience. This approach leaves open many differing views 
of colour vision, each of which might have interesting and unexplored philosophical 
consequences. As I discuss later, the view that I find most plausible is that the constitutive 
bedrock for the possession of colour vision is the ability to achieve colour constancy. The 
ensuing argument draws out a surprising consequence of this constitutive thesis: that colour 
vision thus understood does not involve the ability to see colours in the categorically 
committed sense. Even if the reader does not agree with my constancy-centric constitutive 
starting point, however, the argument should still be of interest as an illustration of the 
constitutive approach at work. 
There have been some important steps in the direction of the constitutive approach in 
the recent philosophical literature, (and hence away from the orthodox experiential view 
described above). For example, Thompson and colleagues ([1998]) were among the first to 
bring comparative, interspecies, studies of colour vision to the attention of philosophers. This 
work highlighted the great variety of colour-related capacities encountered throughout the 
animal kingdom, and emphasised the fact that colour vision is a significant psychological 
kind featuring in actual empirical attributions and explanations across a diverse range of 
organisms.4 Such comparative studies in turn provided one of the key motivations for 
Matthen’s ([1999], [2005]) pluralist account of colour ontology. These philosophers bucked 
the major historical trend by deemphasising the evidential role of normal human experience 
in understanding colour vision and, consequently, colour. Such considerations breached the 
4 The significance of comparative studies of colour vision is now more widely appreciated. For example, see 
Allen ([2009]), Byrne & Hilbert ([2003], pp. 15-16), Cohen ([2009], pp. 26-29), and Kalderon ([2007], p. 578). 
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experiential orthodoxy, and furthermore undermine any constitutive-cum-experiential view of 
the sort adumbrated above. While these developments are undoubtedly significant, however, 
in my view their focus on the implications of animal colour vision has obscured a crucial 
point much closer to home. We can all agree that ordinary human colour experience provides 
an unsuitable model for the colour vision capacities of other animals; but I would add that 
ordinary colour experience cannot even be taken as a presumptive guide to the core nature of 
our very own colour vision abilities. It is this last, seemingly redoubtable, vestige of the 
experiential view that I seek to undermine in what follows. 
In voicing scepticism about the informativeness of ordinary colour experience for a 
constitutive account of colour vision, I am not claiming that phenomenology is irrelevant to 
our understanding of this kind. In empirical methodology, the study of visual perception 
obviously couldn’t get off the ground without it. I allow, moreover, that visual experience 
plays an inalienable role in providing our initial identifying characteristics of colour vision 
qua psychological kind. This point is compatible, however, with the claim that colour vision 
is not constitutively associated with features of our ordinary conscious experience of colour. 
This is by now a familiar point in the philosophy of science: explanatory kinds are often, if 
not typically, initially identified via features that ultimately turn out to be merely superficial 
or contingent features of those kinds. Once such an identification has been made, an account 
of a kind’s nature may allow instances to be identified or hypothesised in circumstances in 
which the initial means of identification are partially, or even completely, absent.5 As such, 
whatever the role of experience in acquainting us with colour vision qua psychological kind, 
we should not attempt straightforwardly to infer or ‘read off’ the nature of these visual 
abilities from features of our ordinary experience of colour. That our ordinary experience of 
colour typically or even canonically displays some feature F does not entail that F is a 




                                                        
constitutive feature of our colour vision capacities. That is to say, not all functionally 
significant features of colour experience will be constitutively necessary for the possession of 
colour vision. 
These last claims presuppose that colour experience has a latent and underappreciated 
complexity. Although colour is traditionally conceived as a paradigmatic ‘low-level’, 
‘simple’, or ‘basic’ perceptible feature, colour experience in fact reflects the upshot of a wide 
range of perceptual, structural, organisational, recognitory, and broadly conceptual abilities or 
processes. As in other areas of cognition, this composite nature is not transparent to the naïve 
subject, whose experience of colour is monolithic and unified. Patterns of breakdown and 
dissociation among such processes in impaired subjects, while clearly unfortunate, therefore 
provide one of the few keys to unlocking this complexity. Two processes that are ordinarily 
reflected in colour experience, and which will be central in what follows, are colour 
constancy and CP for colour. In the next Section, I argue that it is possible that the processes 
required to maintain colour constancy could become completely dissociated from those 
involved in colour categorisation. I also claim that colour constancy is constitutively both 
necessary and sufficient for the possession of colour vision. It follows that colour vision qua 
constancy can be dissociated from our ability to perceive superordinate colour categories 
such as red and orange. If this is correct, then at least one pervasive and vivid feature of our 
ordinary experience of colour is not, strictly speaking, part of the nature of our ability 
visually to perceive colour. The feature in question is that of seeing colours, in the 
categorically committed sense.6  
 
3. The Central Argument 
6 Compare Akins ([2001], p. 110), who challenges the assumption that ‘what we see consciously provides the 
raison d’être of the spectral system – that the purpose of the colour system is to produce “the colours”’. 
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My central argument is as follows. 
1. Necessarily, for any organism x, x possesses colour vision if and only if x possesses 
the ability to achieve colour constancy. (CC) 
2. Therefore, necessarily, for any organisms x, y, x and y are alike in respect of their 
core, constitutive, abilities visually to perceive colour if and only if x and y are alike 
in respect of their ability to achieve colour constancy. 
3. Necessarily, for any organisms x, y, if x and y are alike in respect of their ability to 
discriminate visually among a) the surface spectral reflectance properties (SSRs) of 
objects in the environment, and b) the wavelength properties of the ambient 
illumination, then x and y are alike in respect of their ability to achieve colour 
constancy.7 (DV) 
4. Therefore, necessarily, for any organisms x, y, if x and y are alike in respect of the 
visual discriminations they are able to make between SSRs and the wavelength 
properties of the ambient illumination, then x and y are alike in respect of their 
constitutive colour vision abilities. (2, 3) 
5. It is possible that an organism with exactly the same visual discriminatory abilities 
as a normal human could completely lack CP for colour. 
6. Therefore, it is possible that two organisms exactly alike in respect of their 
constitutive colour vision abilities could differ in respect of whether they possess CP 
for colour. (4, 5) 
7 Note that in fixing on SSRs and properties of the illuminant, I am not prejudging the question of colour 
ontology. My approach is similar to Matthen ([1999], p. 78), who presents a broadly functional characterisation 




                                                        
7. Therefore, CP for colour does not form part of the constitutive nature of normal 
human colour vision abilities. 
Premises one and three, CC and DV, are complementary and need to be understood in 
conjunction. CC claims that colour vision constitutively involves the ability to achieve colour 
constancy. This raises the question as to how colour constancy itself should be characterised. 
DV presents a discriminatory view, on which one’s ability to achieve colour constancy 
supervenes on one’s visual discriminatory abilities with respect to SSRs and wavelength 
properties of the illuminant. Together CC and DV imply premise 4, on which an organism’s 
constitutive colour vision abilities supervene on its visual discriminatory capacities. Premise 
5 is the key dissociative claim that it is possible to dissociate an organism’s capacity to 
perceive colour thus understood from its ability for CP for colour. The following subsections 
address these claims in more detail.  
 
3.1. Colour constancy and discrimination 
The constitutive approach holds that our starting point for philosophical theorising about 
colour vision should be to understand the nature of colour vision qua psychological kind. As 
noted above, this general approach is consistent with many differing views of colour vision, 
not all of which can be explored here. My preferred view is CC. The view that perceptual 
constancies mark constitutive bedrock for visual perception has been defended at length in 
recent work by Burge ([2010]) and in Davies ([unpublished]). In the philosophy of colour, 
Hilbert ([1992]) has also defended a thesis close to CC.8 I take this work for granted in what 
8 Smith ([2002]) also argues that perceptual constancy is necessary and sufficient for perception. As Burge 
([2010], p. 409n) notes, Smith’s view of constancy is overtly phenomenological in character and is not aimed at 
understanding the nature of constancy qua psychological kind. Thompson et al. ([1998], p. 380) agree on the 
centrality of colour constancy to colour vision, but claim in addition that colour vision ‘involves’ additive colour 
mixture and colour contrast. They do not explain why additive colour mixture should be necessary for colour 
vision. Akins & Hahn ([2014]) have also stressed the importance of chromatic contrast for colour vision. In my 
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follows, and hence shall say fairly little in defence of CC. Readers who reject CC need not be 
deterred, however, for two reasons. 
First, even without CC my argument warrants the conclusion that colour constancy, if 
not colour vision per se, does not constitutively involve the ability to see colours in the 
categorically committed sense. This weaker thesis still should be of interest to philosophers 
working on colour, and to those interested in the nature of perceptual constancy more 
generally. Second, although it is philosophically revisionary, the view of colour vision 
implied by CC and DV is by some, more empirical, lights reassuringly conservative. Among 
vision scientists, the textbook standard for the possession of colour vision is the ability to 
discriminate differences in wavelength properties of light.9 My view bears some similarities 
in taking colour vision to supervene on capacities visually to discriminate both wavelength 
properties and SSRs of objects in the environment. (As will become clear, however, my view 
employs a representational notion of visual discrimination, which is richer than the 
behavioural, operational, notion assumed in vision science. DV thus implies that colour 
constancy is a resolutely representational phenomenon.) If the reader therefore can stretch to 
accepting premise four, then this together with premise five will suffice for my conclusion.
 In brief, the central motivation for CC is that the achievement of perceptual constancy 
with respect to some feature – shape, motion, size, depth, colour – marks the transition from 
mere sensory registration of, or informational sensitivity to, features of the proximal stimulus, 
to fully fledged representational sensitivities to distal features of the environment.10 In the 
case of colour constancy, the transition is from those organisms that possess wavelength 
sensitive cells or organs, but whose associated abilities and behaviours are subsumable under 
view, there are important but under-theorised connections between colour constancy and colour contrast. I hope 
to discuss this in future work. 
9 For example, see Gordon and Abramov ([2001], p. 93). Compare the aforementioned functional 
characterisation in Matthen ([1999], p. 78). 




                                                                                                                                                                            
non-cognitive, non-representational, notions of phototaxis, photokinesis, phototropism, and 
so on; to organisms that possess abilities to extract from the proximal stimulus reliably 
veridical representations of distal features of the environment, and whose abilities and 
behaviours thus come to be explicable only via the rich cognitive, representational, 
explanatory resources of visual perceptual psychology.11 Visual representations of distal 
features possess a primary biological and ecological significance in underwriting and guiding 
organisms’ basic activities such as foraging, eating, initiating or avoiding predation, seeking 
out a mate, locating shelter, and so on. For this reason the central preoccupation of much 
vision science has been to explain how perceptual constancies are achieved.12 Palmer and 
colleagues ([2003], p. 314) express a common view, 
 
In our opinion, constancy provides the single most crucial landmark in visual 
processing. It is the set of visual operations whose presumed job it is to convert visual 
representations that encode image-based (retina-based) features into ones that encode 
environment-based (object-based) features... [M]any of the most crucial inferences the 
visual system must make are concerned with the logical leap from 2-D representations 
to some more ecologically useful representations that contain explicit information 
about properties of external, environmental objects. 
 
The ability to achieve constancy thus marks a significant cut – a difference in kind– among 
organisms with sensory capacities. The proposal is that this cut marks the boundary between 
the merely sensory, and the genuinely perceptual. To borrow from Burge ([2010], p. 413), 
‘perceptual constancies are paradigmatic marks of objectification. I think that their presence 
in a sensory system is necessary and sufficient for the system’s being a perceptual system.’ 
11 For discussion of taxes and their relevance to understanding the lower, pre-constancy, borders of visual 
perceptual representation, see Burge ([2010], p. 326 ff). 
12 According to Thompson ([1995], p. 43) the achievement of perceptual constancy is ‘the central information-
processing problem’ studied by computational theories of vision, which have the strongest claim to the title of 
Kuhnian ‘normal science’ in the study of perception. 
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In emphasising constancy as the core constitutive standard for colour vision, I am not 
denying that colour vision as instantiated in humans and other species displays many other 
functionally significant features besides constancy. Others may wish to emphasise these 
different features. In many cases, the descriptive or explanatory context may indeed demand 
a more inclusive approach. The rationale behind CC, however, is to provide a maximally 
general, cross-cutting, characterisation of colour vision; a standard that unifies the many 
varied colour vision systems encountered across the animal kingdom. As such it is telling that 
all animals currently known to possess colour vision seem to exhibit colour constancy to 
some degree. For example, comparative studies have found evidence for colour constancy in 
the honeybee (Neumeyer [1981]; Werner et al. [1988]), goldfish (Dörr and Neumeyer [2000]; 
Neumeyer et al. [2002]), butterfly (Kinoshita and Arikawa [2000]), and diurnal and nocturnal 
hawkmoth (Balkenius and Kelber [2004]), to name a few. Neumeyer ([1998], p. 347) infers 
from these findings that ‘colour constancy... is indeed essential for colour vision’. In contrast, 
although comparative studies have found signs of CP for colour in some non-human species, 
the evidence is far more limited and equivocal. Kelber & Osorio ([2010], p. 1622), for 
example, report that ‘other than in birds, and the limited evidence from fish, there is little 
convincing evidence for colour categorisation in other species, including non-human 
primates...’13 
One possible objection to CC is that colour constancy is largely achieved on the 
cheap, in that it is attributable to very low-level, pre-representational, processes such as 
retinal adaptation. If colour constancy is in fact a predominantly pre-representational process, 
this would undermine the idea that constancy is constitutive of colour vision. In response, I 
take issue with the claim that colour constancy is solely or even predominantly attributable to 
processes of retinal adaptation. Such processes are doubtless important in many viewing 
13 Kelber & Osorio do caution, however, that ‘application of suitable tests may well change this view.’ 
13 
 
                                                        
contexts, but numerous studies indicate that subjects are capable of extremely reliable colour 
constancy judgements across changes in illumination that are too rapid to allow for 
significant adaptation.14 
These points notwithstanding, my main issue with the objection is that there is no 
valid inference from ‘X is largely attributable to non-representational processes’ to ‘X is non-
representational’. This inference slips from a claim about the mechanisms responsible for X, 
to a claim about the nature of X itself. I assume that many paradigmatically representational 
cognitive capacities – such as intentional action, reasoning, and linguistic understanding – are 
realised by a wide range of neural mechanisms, not all of which involve representation. The 
fact that an entire system, module, or process might have component mechanisms that are 
non-representational should not impugn the representational nature of the system, module, or 
process itself. Now as I understand it, perceptual constancy is a resolutely representational 
phenomenon. This reflects mainstream empirical assumptions, as seen in the above quote 
from Palmer and colleagues ([2003], p. 314). Even granting that some – perhaps even the 
majority – of the component mechanisms involved in achieving colour constancy are non-
representational, then, this provides no good reason to doubt the representational nature of 
constancy qua psychological kind.15 
Having proposed CC as a constitutive standard for colour vision, we must now 
confront the question as to how colour constancy itself should be characterised. This is a 
contentious matter, and the subject of ongoing debate. The default characterisation of colour 
constancy in both philosophical and empirical work is known as ‘appearance invariantism’. 
Invariantism characterises colour constancy as the phenomenon whereby objects visually 
appear approximately the same in respect of colour across changes in illumination. ‘Colour 
14 For example, see Foster et al. ([1991]) and Foster et al. ([2001]). I discuss the limitations of adaptation-based 
conceptions of constancy in more detail in Davies ([forthcoming]). 
15 For a survey of the multiplicity of mechanisms involved in colour constancy, see Smithson ([2005]). 
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appearance’ here is to be understood in the quasi-technical sense familiar to vision scientists, 
as pertaining to the aspect of perceptual phenomenology represented by multi-dimensional 
colour appearance spaces, such as the standard three dimensional hue-saturation-lightness 
(HSL) space. On this view, then, a subject’s degree of colour constancy is determined by the 
extent to which these qualitative dimensions of visual experience – say, an object’s hue and 
saturation – remain invariant under changes in illumination. Information about the illuminant 
is not visually represented on this view: the standard line is that such information is 
‘discarded’ or ‘discounted’ in the process of generating illumination-invariant colour 
appearances. 
Against this naïve view, ‘variantists’ have argued that colour constancy cannot be 
grounded in appearance invariance, most notably due to psychophysical evidence that 
changes in illumination in fact produce quite significant variations in an object’s hue and 
saturation.16 On this view, information about the illuminant is not discarded by the visual 
system, but rather retained and reflected in the qualitative dimensions of colour appearance. 
In a broadly Helmholtzian spirit, variantists seek to characterise colour constancy by 
appealing to the representational outputs of putative, quasi-cognitive, processes of perceptual 
‘inference’. On this view, the visual system supposedly ‘infers’ or otherwise derives 
representations of objects’ stable, illumination-independent, surface colours, from patterns of 
illumination-dependent change in objects’ phenomenal colour appearance.17 
Invariantism and variantism mark the traditional poles in philosophical debates about 
colour constancy. I want to consider an alternative characterisation that has arisen in the 
16 The classic empirical study is Arend & Reeves ([1986]). See Cohen ([2008]) for a variantist, neo-
Helmholtzian, interpretation of these data. 
17 Wright ([2013]) discusses such views under the label of ‘projective’ accounts of constancy. 
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empirical literature, but which has not received much philosophical attention. This is the 
operational view (OV) of Craven and Foster ([1992], p. 1360),18 
  
[We present] an alternative and complementary property of colour constancy, as 
follows: The ability of a subject to correctly attribute changes in the colour 
appearance of a scene either to changes in the spectral composition of the illuminant 
or to changes in the reflecting properties of that scene. 
 
According to OV, the key criterion for colour constancy is the possession of abilities to 
‘discriminate’ a change in reflectance from a change in illumination. These abilities can be 
assessed in psychophysical tasks in which the subject is presented with a coloured stimulus 
with reflectance properties R1 under illuminant A, proceeded either by the same stimulus 
under another illuminant B, or by a different stimulus with reflectance R2. The subject is then 
asked to push one of two buttons depending on whether they judge the change that has 
occurred to be in the surface properties of the stimulus, or in the illumination. High levels of 
colour constancy correspond to high degrees of accuracy in identifying changes in 
illumination and changes in stimulus reflectance as such. That is, subjects do well if a change 
from illuminant A to illuminant B is not confused or conflated with a change in the surface 
properties of the stimulus. Similarly, they do well if a change in stimulus reflectance from R1 
to R2 is not conflated with a change in illumination. 
 How does OV contrast with invariantism and variantism? Unlike invariantism, OV 
does not ground colour constancy in the stability of colour appearance across changes in 
illumination. As Craven and Foster ([1992], p. 1364) remark, ‘it may be irrelevant whether 
the colour appearance of an object does or does not change under a change in illuminant, 
providing that any changes that do occur can be correctly attributed’. Insofar as OV allows 
18 Also see Foster & Nascimento ([1994]). 
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for constancy in circumstances of significant illumination-dependent change in colour 
appearance, it clearly has affinities with variantism. Unlike variantism, however, OV does not 
ground constancy in putative processes of perceptual inference from variant colour 
appearance to illumination-independent surface colour properties. Moreover, OV is not 
committed to the claim that colour constancy canonically or typically involves such 
illumination-dependent phenomenology. As I read the view, OV is strictly neutral on this 
issue. So long as the subject is capable of differentiating changes in illumination from 
changes in surface reflectance, then the degree of appearance (in)variance that she encounters 
is simply ‘irrelevant’ in evaluating her constancy capacities. 
OV’s discriminatory characterisation is thus consistent with invariantist and variantist 
views of colour appearance, and indeed with other, more complex, views of the 
phenomenology of colour constancy.19 This phenomenological neutrality is appealing for 
those seeking a maximally general, cross-cutting, characterisation of colour constancy. As 
discussed elsewhere (Davies [forthcoming]), the empirical data suggest that neither 
invariantism nor variantism uniquely characterises the phenomenology of constancy. In 
contrast, it does seem that wherever we are inclined to attribute constancy, we should find 
robust capacities to discriminate changes in illumination from changes in surface reflectance 
properties. Absenting these capacities, an organism would be liable regularly to confuse or 
conflate changes in illumination for changes in an object’s surface properties, and vice versa. 
Such an organism would not display any evidence of having disentangled the respective 
contributions of these variables to its overall perceptual state: such an organism would lack 
colour constancy. 
19 In Davies ([forthcoming]), I argue that OV is consistent with ‘complex invariantism’, a view on which visual 
experience has qualitative dimensions for both material and lighting colour, numbering six dimensions in total. 
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This last point suggests that OV presents at least a necessary condition on colour 
constancy: no capacity to discriminate between illumination and surface changes implies no 
colour constancy. Is the condition also sufficient? This suggestion is problematic, for there 
are strong reasons to think that discrimination, at least in the sense intended by OV, is not 
necessarily sufficient for colour constancy. Recall that OV is an ‘operational’ view of 
constancy, on which capacities to discriminate are explicitly linked to performance in a 
psychophysical task. On this view, a subject discriminates a change in reflectance from a 
change in illumination just in case she provides largely correct behavioural responses – in this 
case, button presses – in tasks of the sort described above. One might reasonably object, 
however, that discriminatory behaviour of this type does not necessarily suffice for the 
attribution of genuine perceptual, representational, abilities with respect to distal features of 
the environment. That is to say, it is conceivable that an organism could display such 
discriminatory behaviour, while altogether lacking genuine visual representational abilities.20 
Now of course we assume that all human subjects actually assessed in these experiments do 
possess such abilities, and that their task performance can be taken as evidence of their 
perceptual capacities. But the mere possibility of discriminatory behaviour in the absence of 
visual representation undermines the proposal that OV can characterise colour constancy qua 
constitutive standard for colour vision. 
The discriminatory view of colour constancy (DV) presented in premise 3 is designed 
to avoid these problems with OV.21 DV is clearly inspired by OV, and shares its empirical 
motivations. DV follows OV in characterising colour constancy via capacities visually to 
20 This echoes Hilbert’s ([1992]) central objection to the sufficiency of the wavelength discrimination criterion 
for colour vision. See also Matthen ([1999], p. 52). 
21 Despite the order of presentation, DV is explanatorily prior to CC: we require a working characterisation of 
colour constancy, prior to claiming that colour constancy is constitutive of colour vision. In practice, however, 
philosophical attempts at characterising colour constancy inevitably draw on ongoing empirical research, much 
of which simultaneously provides motivation for CC. This does not create any vicious circularity, so long as we 
are careful to distinguish the project of extracting a maximally general understanding of ‘colour constancy’ as it 
occurs in such studies, from the project of inferring what these studies tell us about the nature of colour vision. 
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discriminate differences in distal properties. More precisely, an organism’s ability to achieve 
colour constancy supervenes on its capacities to discriminate visually among SSRs of objects 
in the environment, and wavelength properties of the ambient illumination. Necessarily, any 
change in the degree of colour constancy that an organism is able to achieve in a given 
viewing context implies some underlying change in these visual discriminatory abilities. 
Whereas OV adopts a behavioural concept of discrimination, however, DV employs an 
inherently visual representational notion. On this view, S is able to discriminate visually 
between X and Y just in case S is able to form representations, within a perceptual subsystem 
that can be antecedently described as visual, with the veridicality conditions that X and Y are 
distinct, and moreover that these representations are reliably veridical within some suitably 
restricted range of actual and counterfactual cases.22 Here the relevant discriminatory 
responses are not patterns of behaviour, judgement, or report: the discriminatory responses 
are representational states of the visual system. 
According to DV, then, an organism’s colour constancy capacities supervene on its 
abilities to generate discriminatory perceptual representations of both SSRs and wavelength 
properties of the ambient illumination. It is important to note that what are being 
discriminated in this case are not objects, but rather property types themselves; more 
accurately, property types as presented by their property instances. In discriminating between 
the reflectance properties R1 and R2 of objects a and b, then, my visual system does not 
simply represent that a and b differ in respect of reflectance: it (somehow) represents that the 
property types R1 and R2 are distinct. What form would these putative representations take? 
This question requires a paper in its own right, but for present purposes we can adopt an 
inclusive view. For example, one idea would be that the visual system represents something 
22 This model is inspired by Williamson’s ([1990]) cognitive account of discrimination, on which to 
discriminate a from b is to activate the knowledge that a and b are distinct. My characterisation aims to preserve 
Williamson’s insight that discrimination proper implies capacities for reliably veridical representation of 
distinctness, while doing away with the epistemic baggage. 
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of the form ‘the surface property presented by this object differs from the surface property 
presented by that object’. Another possibility is that the visual system employs some as yet 
unknown type of direct representation of tropes or property instances, as in ‘this surface 
property differs from that surface property’. In both cases, the relation that is represented as 
holding between these properties also remains to be clarified. One possibility is that ‘differs 
from’ represents a brute relation of non-identity. Another possibility, which I find more 
plausible, is that this relation will be unpacked in terms of a direction and magnitude of 
difference in some quality space. However these issues turn out, the key overarching claim is 
that these visual discriminatory abilities are grounded in non-atomic, relational, 
representations within the colour vision system. 
These clarificatory remarks bring out another important difference between DV and 
OV. According to OV, colour constancy requires the capacity to discriminate between two 
stimulus conditions or states of affairs: namely, the condition of having undergone a change 
in surface properties, versus the condition of having undergone a change in illumination. DV, 
in contrast, requires the capacity (somehow) to represent the types of surface property or 
illumination instantiated by these stimuli as distinct. By implication, DV requires the subject 
to be capable of visually representing types of surface property and illumination and, 
moreover, to discriminate dimensions of change in respect of these properties. 
In saying that colour constancy requires the visual representation of both surface 
properties and the illuminant, once again I want to remain neutral on the precise types of 
representation involved, and on how these representations influence or determine the 
organism’s visual experience of the scene. I allow, for example, that some organisms may 
explicitly represent both surface and lighting properties via qualitative dimensions of the 
phenomenology of visual experience. Indeed as I argue in Davies ([forthcoming]), this 
plausibly is often the case in normal human subjects. Another possibility, however, is that 
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one or more type of representation is processed by nonconscious or subpersonal perceptual 
processes. However these issues turn out, the main claim for DV is simply that colour 
constancy requires some sort of visual representation of the illumination conditions, such as 
to undergird the organism’s perceptual discriminations of changes in the illuminant. DV thus 
marks another significant departure from traditional models of constancy, on which 
illumination information is simply ‘discarded’ or ‘discounted’ in the process of generating a 
stable surface colour estimate.23 
DV is clearly hostage to empirical fortune in various ways. First, DV predicts that 
differences in respect of the degree of colour constancy that an organism can achieve in a 
given context should be reflected somewhere, somehow, in the organism’s capacity to 
discriminate both SSRs and properties of the illuminant. The view therefore would be 
disconfirmed, for example, by evidence of significant impairments to colour constancy with 
largely preserved capacities visually to discriminate these properties. Second, eventually we 
should be able to identify plausible neural substrates for DV in humans, and to identify 
functionally similar substrates in all other creatures thought to possess colour constancy. 
These substrates moreover should be capable of sustaining perceptual representations of 
features of both object surfaces and illumination conditions, and these representations should 
be capable of driving the organism’s behaviour in responding to changes in either surface or 
illumination properties as such. Third, DV should prove illuminating and explanatory in 
characterising colour constancy capacities in empirical practice. DV would be disconfirmed, 
to some extent, if it provided little or no help in understanding the nature of colour constancy 
23 A referee raised the following objection. Consider an organism with a visual system very much like ours, but 
situated in a world populated only by coloured lights and no surfaces. Such an organism would be able to 
discriminate between the colours of lights, but on my view would not exhibit colour constancy. It seems 
implausible to suppose, however, that such an organism would lack colour vision. In response, note that an 
organism with a visual system very much like ours would, ipso facto, retain the ability to achieve colour 
constancy, even if situated in a world in which there are no surfaces, and hence where it is not possible to 
discriminate differences in SSRs. On my view, then, despite being unable to exercise its capacity for colour 




                                                        
capacities in both human and non-human cases. It should be noted, however, that DV is not 
intended to provide a complete characterisation of colour constancy in normal humans. The 
aim is rather that of providing a maximally general, all inclusive, characterisation of 
constancy; an account that is suited to our project of identifying a core, basic, and unifying 
feature of colour vision. I believe that DV is well suited to this purpose, and that the view will 
withstand the demands and tests of evolving empirical practice and philosophical theory. 
There are several alternative characterisations of colour constancy that cannot be 
considered here. One particularly pertinent view, however, is the categorical view of colour 
constancy (CVCC) presented by Thompson ([1995], pp. 196-7),24 
 
The key to colour constancy is to be found in this joining of object identification and 
categorical colour perception. Rather than providing constant perceptual indicators of 
surface reflectance, the primary role of colour vision is probably to generate a 
relatively stable set of perceptual categories that can facilitate object identification 
and then guide behaviour accordingly... If colour constancy is an adaptation, it is 
better regarded not as an adaptation for object detection via the recovery of surface 
reflectance, but rather as an adaptation for integrating a physically heterogeneous 
collection of distal stimuli into a small set of visually salient equivalence classes... 
 
Thompson argues that the primary function of colour vision is probably to aid object 
recognition, a task that requires only coarse grained information as to which colour category 
the object belongs to. Colour constancy is then seen primarily as functioning to ensure that 
objects are assigned the same colour category under differing illuminants, for the purposes of 
object (re-)identification. This view clearly differs somewhat from DV. More worryingly, 
however, by tying colour constancy so closely to colour categorisation, CVCC threatens my 
central claim that colour vision qua constancy can be completely dissociated from CP for 
colour. 
24 Thompson here follows Jameson & Hurvich ([1989], p. 195). See also Olkkonen et al ([2010]), Hardin 
([1992]), Hatfield ([1992]), and Troost & De Weert ([1991], p. 596). 
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I offer two responses; the first defensive, the second more concessive. The first 
concerns CVCC’s emphasis on the role of colour constancy in facilitating object recognition. 
Identifying an object as Bruce or as a banana presumably involves the activation of some 
memory representation of the individual or kind in question. Given our limited storage 
capacities, we can predict that much visual information will be stored in memory in 
simplified, discretised, and easily accessible forms. And indeed there is evidence that 
information about colour is represented in visual memory in categorical form.25 Insofar as 
object identification involves the activation of memory representations of colour, then, it is 
plausible that these would be categorical representations of colour. The problem with CVCC 
is that by focusing on the functional associations between constancy and object recognition, it 
risks imputing features of the representations involved in colour memory onto those involved 
in sustaining occurrent colour constancy. These dangers are well recognised in the empirical 
literature. Kay and Regier ([2006], p. 53) note that ‘much of the evidence for categorical 
“perception” of colour comes from tasks that involve memory; hence it could be that the 
category effects stem from memory rather than perception.’26 Boynton and colleagues 
([1989], pp. 229-230) similarly note that ‘common experience suggests that, when colours 
must be remembered, categorisation is required’, and present evidence that categorical effects 
can be induced in simple colour discrimination tasks ‘provided that the stimuli to be 
compared are separated temporally.’27 Even if colour constancy does function in part to aid 
object recognition, the categorical representations implicated in this process might better be 
attributed to memory than colour constancy itself. 
 My second response concedes that DV does offer quite a narrow perspective on the 
nature and role of colour constancy. As noted above, this reflects my central explanatory aim 
25 See Raftapopolous ([2010]), particularly section 4.3 for discussion. 
26 See also Huttenlocher et al. ([2000]). 
27 In contrast, however, Franklin et al. ([2005]) present evidence for CP in visual search tasks, which minimise 
the role of memory. 
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of accounting for colour constancy, hence colour vision, in all its varied guises. In this 
context, narrowness avoids over specificity and affords greater generality. It must be 
acknowledged, however, that some will think it impossible or at least misguided to divorce 
consideration of colour constancy from the downstream functions that it serves. Viewing 
constancy in this more holistic way will likely require a far richer and more complicated view 
than that offered by DV. I have no principled objection to such approaches, and indeed I 
would expect them to advance our overall understanding of perception and its integration 
with other cognitive capacities. My approach is simply different, and finer grained, seeking to 
control for as many variables as possible in accounting for this fundamental perceptual kind. 
 
3.2. Dissociating colour vision and categorical perception for colour 
Premise five states that it is possible that an organism with exactly the same discriminatory 
abilities – which by premise four implies the same colour vision abilities – as a normal 
human could completely lack CP for colour. CP is a vivid and pervasive feature of our 
ordinary visual experience of colour. The colour spectrum appears in experience to contain 
segmented regions or bands of colour corresponding to the ordinary categories red, orange, 
yellow, green, blue, indigo, and violet. If asked to name the colours that we see, most of us 
would say that we see red, orange, yellow, or shades of these categories – various reds, 
oranges, and yellows, and so on. It is undoubtedly central to our ordinary understanding of 
colour vision that it involves seeing colours in this categorically committed sense. 
In what follows, CP is characterised as follows. Take three shades of colour, a, b, and 
c, such that the pairs a and b, and b and c, are separated by exactly the same discriminable 
distance, (a and c will be separated by twice that distance), and where a and b are ‘within-
category’ shades – both shades are within the category green, say – and b and c is an ‘across-
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category’ pair – such that c lies within the category blue. Now a subject possesses CP for 
green just in case the within-category shades a and b appear more similar to her than the 
across-category shades b and c, despite the fact that they are separated by the same 
discriminable distance. These differential similarity effects reflect the most central feature of 
CP for colour, namely the banding or warping of the colour spectrum at category boundaries. 
The related similarity judgements with respect to triads of suitably chosen shades also 
provide the simplest and most precise way of assessing whether a subject possesses CP for a 
given category. 
Assessing subjects’ differential similarity judgements in this way is an ‘implicit’ test 
for CP, in that it does not require the subject overtly to attend to or report on the category 
membership of the stimuli. Other measures of CP are available, however. A different implicit 
test involves assessing subjects’ reaction times on tasks in which colour category information 
can either aid or hinder the task’s completion. So-called ‘explicit’ tests for CP require either 
the comprehension or production of a colour category name, or overt attention to category 
membership. Examples include asking subjects to select the ‘best’ or ‘focal instance’ of a 
given colour category, or actively to sort colour chips into categories. It is no doubt possible 
that a subject may possess CP by the lights of one test and not another. As such, we should 
leave open the possibility that these different tests probe different characteristics of CP for 
colour. Ultimately our picture of CP therefore might need to include a cluster of 
characteristics, including but not limited to differential similarity effects. I ignore this 
complication in what follows, however, as I believe that my central argument could be 
extended and rerun so as to accommodate a more complicated view of CP. 
Non-categorical perception (NCP) with respect to a category C is defined as the 
failure to meet the above standard for CP for C. A subject with NCP with respect to green, 
then, would not perceive any differential similarities between stimuli b and c straddling the 
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boundary between green and blue, versus the stimuli a and b that both sit within the category 
green. In other words, the shades a and b, and b and c, would appear equally similar to her. 
The notion of NCP should not seem contentious or surprising: there are obviously far more 
colour categories for which we are non-categorical perceivers than for which we are 
categorical perceivers. Extending this notion, however, we can conceive of a subject who 
fails to exhibit CP with respect to any superordinate colour categories. Let’s call such a 
global absence of CP total NCP. A subject with total NCP would experience the colours of 
the rainbow in a way which is quite unfamiliar. Such a subject would perceive the physical 
continuum of light wavelengths in a rainbow as a non-banded, non-segmented, continuum of 
hues. The spectrum would appear as a pure flux, altogether lacking discrete bands of colour. 
A subject with total NCP would not see all regions of the spectrum as chromatically 
homogenous. They would be able to discriminate between suitably distanced shades all the 
way along the spectrum, and shades that are closer together in this sequence would appear 
more similar than shades which are further apart. What would be lacking is the familiar 
superordinate grouping of these spectral hues which is so vividly apparent in our ordinary 
visual experience of colour. 
My argument for premise five centres on a thought experiment involving two 
subjects: CAT, a normal adult human, and NONCAT, who has exactly the same SSR and 
wavelength discrimination abilities as CAT. Given two colour stimuli a and b of differing 
reflectance properties, CAT can visually discriminate a from b iff NONCAT can visually 
discriminate a from b. By premises three and four, CAT and NONCAT are thus exactly alike 
in respect of their ability to achieve colour constancy, and hence in respect of their colour 
vision abilities. Now imagine that CAT and NONCAT are visually presented with three 
shades a, b, and c, such that a and b, and b and c, (not a and c), are separated by the same 
discriminable distance for CAT and NONCAT: both subjects can just discriminate a from b, 
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and b from c, say.28 All other contextually relevant variables such as the ambient illumination 
and viewing angle are held fixed. The shades a and b belong to the category red, whereas c 
belongs to orange. Now suppose, however, that CAT perceives b as more similar to a than to 
c, whereas NONCAT perceives b as just as similar to a as to c. CAT therefore meets the 
assumed standard for CP with respect to red, whereas NONCAT does not: CAT exhibits the 
requisite differential similarity effects at the boundary of red, whereas NONCAT does not.29 
 Now consider any arbitrary colour category C, and any suitably placed triad of 
discriminable shades a’, b’, and c’, for which CAT exhibits the differential similarity effects 
required for CP with respect to C. By stipulation, the shades a’, b’, and c’, will be equally 
discriminable to CAT and NONCAT. But now suppose that NONCAT fails to exhibit the 
differential similarity effects required for CP with respect to C. NONCAT would thereby fail 
to exhibit CP for any of the categories for which CAT exhibits CP. Moreover, I stipulate that 
there are no other colour categories for which NONCAT exhibits CP, but for which CAT 
doesn’t. NONCAT is therefore exactly similar to CAT in respect of her visual discriminatory 
abilities, and yet has total NCP for colour. If genuinely possible, this scenario establishes that 
a subject exactly like a normal human in respect of the constitutive, discriminatory, standard 
for colour vision could altogether lack CP for colour. 
Does NONCAT present a genuine possibility? Is it possible that two subjects exactly 
alike in respect of their visual discriminatory abilities nonetheless could differ in respect of 
their CP for colour? It might be thought not, for CP is often, if not typically, characterised as 
a discrimination effect. In the introduction to a seminal collection of papers on this topic, for 
example, Harnad ([1987], p. 3) states that CP requires that ‘the subject can discriminate 
smaller physical differences between pairs of stimuli that straddle that boundary than between 
28 See Palmer ([1999], pp. 671-72) for discussion of just noticeable differences. 
29 I assume that NONCAT also fails on all other implicit or explicit tests for CP noted above. 
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pairs that are within one category or the other’. In another influential study, Bornstein and 
Korda ([1984], p. 208) say that CP is characterised by the ‘nonmonotonic character of 
discriminability along [the] correlate physical dimensions’ of a given perceptible feature. 
Taken at face value, this characterisation implies that two subjects differing in respect of CP 
for colour ipso facto would differ in their discriminatory abilities. This would cause trouble 
for our imagined scenario involving CAT and NONCAT, for CAT and NONCAT were 
stipulated to be exactly alike in respect of their discriminatory abilities and yet utterly 
different in respect of CP for colour. 
Despite the quoted assertions to the contrary, the overwhelming evidence seems to be 
that CP for colour is not in fact a function of discrimination performance. Hardin ([1997], p. 
293) comments as follows, 
 
It is important to understand that the resemblance that connects two instances of the 
same colour category is not necessarily a function of the perceptual [i.e. 
discriminable] distance between them. It is not hard to find three colour samples A, B, 
and C, [where] B is separated from A on the one side and C on the other by the same 
number of just-noticeable differences, and yet A and B are seen to belong to the same 
colour category whereas C is seen to belong to a different colour category. 
 
Hardin is clearly not claiming that ordinary subjects do not possess CP for colour, but simply 
pointing out difficulties in reducing the similarity effects that are characteristic of CP to 
discrimination performance. Franklin and Davies ([2004], p. 352, note 2) make the same 
point, 
 
[Inequality in discriminable distance] would not really be equivalent to adult 
categorical perception. Equivalent non-uniformities also occur within categories. 
Thus, quasi-categorical effects should also be found within categories. It might be 
thought that it is this variation in discriminability that drives category formation. 
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Category boundaries occur at local discrimination maxima. This fits the blue-green 
boundary; there is a discrimination peak at about the right place. But, it is much less 
clear for green-yellow and yellow-orange-red.30 
 
Franklin and Davies argue that differential similarity effects are not in fact a function of 
discrimination, because discrimination performance does not peak at the category boundaries 
between green and yellow, yellow and orange, and orange and red. If differences in 
discrimination underlay CP, moreover, then we should expect to experience more colour 
categories than we in fact do, given the existence of local discrimination maxima within 
categories.  
Further evidence for the dissociation between CP for colour and discrimination 
performance is presented by Roberson and colleagues ([2009]). Their study focuses on 
speakers of Korean, who display characteristic CP effects for three categories in the blue-
green region, parang (approximately: blue), chorok (approximately: green), and cheongnok 
(approximately: greenish-blue), whereas English speakers display these effects for only two 
categories: blue and green. Despite these robust differences in CP for colour, however, 
discrimination thresholds across the spectrum were not significantly different for speakers of 
English and Korean. For most actually encountered differential similarity effects with respect 
to colour, then, researchers have failed to account for these effects in terms of differences in 
discrimination. Such evidence provides good reason to think that CP for colour is not 
reducible to discrimination performance. If this is correct, then we should not dismiss the 
possibility involving CAT and NONCAT on the grounds that their differences in CP for 
colour must imply differences in their discriminatory capacities. 
30 Roberson et al. ([2009]) argue that discrimination performance also cannot explain the blue-green category 
boundary. See also Hanley & Roberson ([2011]). 
29 
 
                                                        
Given the evidence cited above, how should we explain the persistence of the 
discriminatory characterisation of CP in the empirical literature?31 I believe that this 
characterisation persists due to a failure clearly to distinguish between notions of 
discriminability and similarity. In experimental contexts, the term ‘discrimination’ is 
typically used to describe any situation in which two sets of stimuli receive different types of 
response. This usage obscures the fact that two sets of stimuli might be equally visually 
discriminable for a subject and yet still be treated differently due to differences in their 
apparent similarity. To make this point concrete, consider the recent study of CP by Winawer 
and colleagues ([2007]). Their experiments involve an ‘ABX test’ paradigm in which 
subjects are presented with a target square together with two test squares, one of which is 
(type-)identical to the target while the other ‘distracter’ square is drawn either from the same 
linguistic category F as the target (the within-category condition) or a different linguistic 
category G (the across-category condition). Subjects are asked to report which of the two test 
squares is the same as the target square. It is assumed that if the subject possesses CP for F, 
then she will be significantly faster at identifying the identical square in the across-category 
condition than the within-category condition. The logic is that if the subject possesses CP for 
F, then the test squares in the across-category condition should appear in some sense more 
different than the test squares in the within-category condition, which should make it easier 
for the subject to identify which of the test squares matches the target square in the across-
category condition. The authors gloss this by saying that subjects with CP demonstrate ‘faster 
discrimination’ between the two fields in the across-category condition. It is crucial to note, 
however, that these experiments do not establish that subjects with CP for F show better 
discrimination of colours, in the sense of being able to make finer visual discriminations 
between colours that lie across category boundaries than between colours that lie within the 
31 What’s more puzzling is that even those who claim to dissociate discrimination and CP continue to 
characterise CP in terms of discrimination performance. See Franklin and Davies ([2004], p. 350). 
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same category. All that is needed to explain the difference in response is to suppose that the 
test fields in the across-category condition appear more dissimilar to subjects with CP for F 
than the test fields in the within-category condition. 
Perhaps the strongest objection to premise five derives from the widespread practice 
among vision scientists of using colour category terms to describe very low level processes in 
the visual system. An early example is the trichromatic theory of Young and Helmholtz, 
which proposed that all colour experiences were the product of the combined outputs of three 
retinal photoreceptor types, which were labelled ‘red’, ‘green’, and ‘blue’ receptors. It is now 
widely acknowledged that these labels are inappropriate, however, and that these receptors 
are better termed ‘long’, ‘medium’, and ‘short’ (L, M, S) wavelength cones.32 The practice 
persists, however, in attempted physiological reductions of opponent process theory (OPT). 
OPT is founded on a set of observations about the phenomenal structure of our ordinary 
visual experience of colour. OPT posits four unique hues, which are hues that do not 
phenomenally appear to be a mixture of any other hue. These hues are typically labelled as 
unique red, unique green, unique yellow, and unique blue. All other colours phenomenally 
appear to be binary, in the sense that they appear to be mixtures of two hues. No colour ever 
appears to be a mixture of red and green, however, and likewise for yellow and blue. These 
pairs are therefore referred to as phenomenally opponent colours.33 On discovery of 
physiologically opponent processes in animal colour vision systems in the 1950s, researchers 
were predictably quick to apply the categorical terminology of phenomenal OPT to these 
processes.34 This practice remains widespread today in both scholarly research articles and 
textbook introductions to colour vision. 
32 See De Valois and De Valois ([1975], p. 107) and Gordon & Abramov ([2001], p. 103). 
33 See Hardin ([1988], pp. 26, 30, 37-39, 52). 
34 Opponent processes were first discovered in the retinal ganglion cells of fish by MacNichol & Svaetichin 
([1958]), and in the lateral geniculate nuclei of macaques by De Valois et al. ([1967]). For a summary, see 
Gordon & Abramov ([2001]). 
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As Mollon ([1997], pp. 868-872) explains, however, the application of category terms 
here is once again precipitous, 
 
We still believe today that there are chromatically antagonistic channels in the early 
visual system—that is, channels that draw inputs of opposite sign from different 
classes of cone, but these channels simply do not correspond to the 
phenomenologically defined channels of Hering […] In fact, no one has found a site 
in the visual system where colour appears to be represented according to Opponent 
Colour theory—that is, a site where the cells might be held to secrete redness and 
greenness or yellowness and blueness... Thirty years ago we thought we understood 
the existence of four unique hues, hues that are phenomenally unmixed. Today this is 
perhaps the major unsolved problem of colour vision. 
 
While colour category terms doubtless provide a helpful façon de parler in describing these 
opponent mechanisms, then, such attributions in no way establish that CP for colour is an 
inherent or fundamental aspect of colour vision. 
A possible rejoinder is that although the application of colour category terms to 
physiological opponent mechanisms is inappropriate, the use of such terms in the original 
phenomenal form of OPT is entirely permissible. Given that phenomenal OPT captures the 
universal structural features of ordinary colour experience, moreover, it follows that colour 
vision is essentially categorical in nature. Let’s flesh this rejoinder out in more detail. As 
noted above, phenomenal OPT is founded on the observation that all colours appear either as 
unique shades of red, green, yellow, and blue, or as binary complexes of these categories, 
such as reddish-blue and greenish-yellow, subject to the constraints of the opponent hue 
pairings.35 Some people seemingly take these phenomenal structural features to impose 
unassailable constraints on the nature of colour vision. For example, Thompson ([1995], p. 9) 
claims that ‘colour vision, whatever else it might be, is the ability to see visual qualities 
35 The ‘hue scaling’ techniques of Jameson & Hurvich ([1959]) and Sternheim & Boynton ([1966]) indicate that 
the terms ‘red’, ‘green’, ‘yellow’, and ‘blue’, and combinations of these terms, are necessary and sufficient to 
describe all of the spectral hues. 
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belonging to the phenomenal hue categories, red, green, yellow, blue’. Now presumably 
Thompson would agree that it is implausible that all animal colour vision involves the ability 
to see qualities belonging to the anthropocentric categories of red, green, yellow, and blue. 
Viewing these comments in light of Thompson’s categorical view of colour constancy 
discussed above, however, it seems reasonable to conclude that he takes phenomenal OPT to 
imply that colour vision constitutively involves the ability visually to represent some colour 
categories or other. 
I offer two points in response. First, as made clear at the outset, a central aim of this 
work is to develop an alternative to the mainstream experiential approach to theorising about 
colour vision. On the present constitutive approach, the fact that colour experience 
canonically displays some feature F is not taken to entail that F is a constitutive feature of 
colour vision. It seems, however, that the argument from the apparently categorical nature of 
phenomenal OPT, to the categorical nature of colour vision, employs just this type of 
inference. Phenomenal OPT is a partial account of the structure of colour appearance, of the 
topology of our ordinary conscious experience of colour. Whether or not this structure 
implies CP for colour, the entire point of this paper has been to challenge the assumption that 
any such structural feature of experience provides an incontrovertible constraint on a 
constitutive account of colour vision. 
It might be objected that by resisting such experiential constraints, I have simply 
changed the changed the subject from that commonly agreed upon by philosophers of 
perception. I reject this charge. My subject is colour vision, which as noted in Section 2 is 
agreed by all parties to be a foundational explanatory notion in this subfield. What has been 
changed is the method or emphasis in studying this phenomenon. My approach seeks to 
understand the distinctive nature of colour vision qua psychological kind, rather than to 
describe the features of our ordinary visual experience of colour. One is of course free to 
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object to any or all aspects of my account. What is not acceptable, however, is to impose an 
experiential conception of colour vision as a precondition on the debate. 
My second response is that even if one remains unconvinced by the last two 
paragraphs, it is in any event mistaken to think that phenomenal OPT structurally implies the 
presence of CP for colour. The unique hues postulated by OPT are typically labelled ‘unique 
red’, ‘unique green’, ‘unique blue’, and ‘unique yellow’. This might suggest a straightforward 
relationship between visually perceiving the unique hues and seeing the colour categories red, 
green, blue, and yellow. This thought is bolstered by empirical evidence that subjects who 
possess CP for these categories typically locate their foci or paradigmatic examples at or very 
close to the corresponding unique hues.36 Despite the undoubted correlations, however, there 
is no constitutive connection between the traditional phenomenally opponent colour space 
and CP for colour. Actual empirical cases suffice to make the point. The aforementioned 
study by Winawer and colleagues ([2007]) indicates that Russian subjects possess CP for two 
categories in the bluish region, roughly corresponding to light blue and dark blue. In 
accordance with OPT, we can assume that Russian subjects perceive a single unique hue in 
the bluish region. This unique hue could not possibly form the focal point for the category 
blue for these subjects, for the simple reason that these subjects do not possess CP for blue, 
but rather for light blue and dark blue. Similarly, Roberson and colleagues ([2009]) found 
that Korean subjects possess CP for three categories, chorok, cheongnok and parang, in the 
blue-green region. In accordance with OPT, we can assume that Korean subjects perceive 
two unique hues in this region: so-called ‘unique blue’ and ‘unique green’. Once again, 
however, these hues could not possibly form the focal points for the colour categories blue or 
green for these subjects, for the simple reason that Korean subjects do not possess CP for 
36 McDaniel ([1972]) first proposed the link between colour category foci and the unique hues. See Wooten & 
Miller ([1997], p. 83). MacLaurey ([1997], p. 263) discusses some problems with this proposal. Philipona & 
O’Regan ([2006]) provide an ecological argument for the origin of the unique hues, focusing on certain 
illumination-invariant regularities in reflectance properties. 
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blue or green. There is no straightforward implication, then, from having experiences of 
colour that can be characterised by phenomenal OPT, to possessing CP for the colour 
categories blue, green, and so on. 
Extending this point, we can see that phenomenal OPT does not imply the possession 
of CP for any colour categories whatsoever. The above cases all involve subjects who possess 
CP for more colour categories than ordinary English speakers. We can easily imagine cases 
in which subjects have CP for fewer colour categories than English speakers, but who still 
perceive the four unique hues posited by OPT. A moderate case would be a subject who 
possessed CP for a category that spanned both blue and green, and hence included both the 
‘unique green’ and ‘unique blue’ hues. A more extreme case would be a subject like 
NONCAT who lacked CP for any colour categories whatsoever, and yet still had experiences 
as of the four unique hues. These points undermine any constitutive connection between 
phenomenal OPT and CP for colour. By the same token, these cases demonstrate how 
misleading it is to label the unique hues postulated by OPT with the category terms ‘red’, 
‘green’, ‘yellow’, and ‘blue’. This response nullifies the biggest threat to premise five, and 
thus clears the way for my conclusion that colour vision does not constitutively involve the 
ability to see colours in the natural, categorically committed, sense. 
The reader at this point might remain unconvinced. Surely, one might object, if a 
normal perceiver perceives unique blue and unique red and also perceives non-unique blues 
and non-unique reds, then she ipso facto perceives colour categories. My response is simply 
to reiterate the adopted characterisation of CP for colour, which requires the presence of 
differential similarity effects between shades of colour at category boundaries. According to 
this standard, even if NONCAT perceives shades that English speakers would call ‘unique 
red’ and ‘non-unique red’, then so long as she does not exhibit the canonical differential 
similarity effects between these shades, she does not possess CP for red. 
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 4. Whorf and the View from Cognitive Neuropsychology 
While colour CP has not featured prominently in philosophical discussions about colour, the 
psychological origin of this ability has been a matter of considerable debate in cognitive 
psychology. The argument of the previous Section introduced evidence for cross-linguistic 
variations in CP, as in the examples of the categorisations made by Russian and Korean 
speakers. These results are part of a recent revival of relativist or Whorfian views of 
perceptual categorisation.37 This marks a significant departure from the Universalist 
orthodoxy of the last forty years, on which the colour categories apparent in our ordinary 
visual experience are deemed universal, presumably very low-level, features of colour vision 
systems. Universalism has undoubtedly permeated philosophy to some degree, perhaps partly 
explaining the widespread assumption that the ability to see colour categories such as red and 
green is somehow inherent to, or part of the nature of, colour vision.38 In its strongest form, 
the Whorfian view holds that all of our perceptual categories are determined (in some sense) 
without constraint by the language that we speak. In Whorf’s words ([1940], p. 213), 
 
The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find 
there because they stare every observer in the face. On the contrary the world is 
presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which have to be organised in our 
minds. This means, largely, by the linguistic system in our minds. 
 
37 For a summary, see Kay & Regier ([2006]). 
38 The Universalist view originates in the seminal cross-cultural study of Berlin & Kay ([1969]). Arguably the 
most widely read and influential philosophical introduction to the science of colour vision, Hardin’s Colour for 
Philosophers, presents the standard Universalist line at ([1988], pp. 156-169).  
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Nobody today would endorse such an extreme view.39 Nevertheless, cross-cultural studies of 
the sort carried out by Winawer and colleagues ([2007]) have been taken to support a weaker 
neo-Whorfian thesis, 
(WT) Some structural differences between colour language systems will be paralleled 
by differences in the colour categories apparent or represented in the visual 
experience of the native speakers of these languages. 
I now introduce some fascinating cognitive neuropsychological cases which have been cited 
as further support for the neo-Whorfian view. Such cases demonstrate that the possibility of a 
total dissociation between core colour vision abilities and CP for colour, on which my 
argument rests, is not only coherent, but also not nearly as distant as one might think. I should 
stress, however, that my central argument is not at all dependent on the truth of neo-
Whorfianism, which is just as well given the highly contentious nature of the view.40 
Reflecting on the neo-Whorfian view is simply helpful in opening our minds to certain 
possibilities as to how things might have been with respect to our colour categorisation 
abilities. 
Some studies in cognitive neuropsychology have addressed a rare condition known as 
visual colour anomia or optic aphasia for colours. Aphasias are linguistic impairments 
typically resulting from a head injury or stroke. Anomia is a type of aphasia involving a 
specific impairment in the production of names or verbal labels. Optic aphasia for colours is 
partly characterised by impairment in the naming of colours. Unlike colour aphasia, which is 
a purely verbal deficit in producing or comprehending colour terms, optic aphasia for colours 
is a visuo-verbal deficit which also results in impairments in the subject’s ability visually to 
39 Compare Quine ([1948], p. 11). 
40 Some of the results taken to motivate a neo-Whorfian view have been called into question. For example, 
Witzel & Gegenfurtner ([2011]) report that attempts to replicate Gilbert et al.’s ([2006]) finding that CP is 
lateralised to the right visual field have been inconsistent. Franklin & Davies ([2004]) also present evidence for 
colour categorisation in pre-linguistic infants, which is hard to explain on a thorough-going Whorfian view. 
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categorise colours. The earliest reports of such cases appear in work by the German 
neurologists Sittig ([1921]), Goldstein and Gelb ([1918]), who described it as an ‘impairment 
of the categorical attitude’ towards colour, and Lange ([1936], p. 88), who says that, 
 
The patients do no behave conceptually but in terms of concrete reality[...] The 
patients have no principle of classification in colour sorting, but depend on the 
experience of coherence between patterns and the other colours. 
 
More recently, Beauvois and Saillant ([1985]) distinguished optic aphasia for colours from 
the more general linguistic deficits associated with colour aphasia, and also from colour-
specific visual agnosia. 
Beauvois and Saillant ([1985]) describe the case of MP, who is diagnosed as having 
optic aphasia for colours. MP’s visual and linguistic abilities with respect to colour were 
assessed via purely verbal, purely visual, and combined visuo-verbal tasks. MP performed 
within the normal range on tasks that required purely verbal processing of colour information. 
The purely visual tasks included colour matching tests, in which subjects are given two wool 
skeins and asked to decide if they are identical or not, and standard pseudo-isochromatic 
plates for colour discrimination. Once again MP’s performance on such tasks was within the 
normal range. In contrast, MP’s performance on visuo-verbal tasks was extremely impaired. 
In one task, MP was asked to produce a verbal colour label in response to a visually presented 
colour sample, or to point to a colour sample given a verbal request. MP’s errors here were 
gross and difficult to understand: she labelled a bright red sample as ‘light yellow’, pointed to 
navy blue when asked to point to orange, and pointed to pale blue when asked to point to the 
colour of parsley. MP was also assessed on the Gelb-Goldstein colour sorting test, which 
requires the subject to ‘select a skein of wool he likes and to pick out all the skeins which he 
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believes can be grouped together with the chosen one’ ([1985], p. 15). Once again, MP’s 
performance was highly unusual ([1985], p. 15), 
 
[S]he started with a pale grey and put it with the other grey, the white and the dark 
wools; then with them she put, in the following order: A pale pink, a pale yellow, a 
brown; she continued by adding all the pale pink and brown wools, and she finished 
by putting all the wools in the same category... On part 4 of the test, in which she was 
asked to select just the red wools, she picked up all the wools except for 10 (white, 
black, grey, one brown, four grey and two green); she seemed to select them without 
any apparent logic in order (e.g., she picked out a green wool just after a pink one, or 
a red just after a green). 
 
It is significant to note that both of these visuo-verbal tasks are paradigmatic explicit tests for 
colour CP, which I mentioned in Section 3.2. MP’s behaviour thus presents an intriguing 
dissociation between purely visual discriminatory abilities with respect to colour, on the one 
hand, and performance on explicit tests for colour CP, on the other. Despite their extreme 
problems with explicit colour categorisation tasks, however, patients with optic aphasia for 
colour often perform within the normal range on implicit categorisation tasks, including the 
canonical test for differential similarity judgements across category boundaries.41 By the 
lights of the assumed standard for CP in this paper, then, these subjects class as possessing 
CP for colour. 
As Roberson and colleagues ([1999]) point out, a probable cause of this unusual 
categorising behaviour is the subject’s linguistic deficit. Roberson and colleagues thus take 
such cases as evidence for the neo-Whorfian view of colour categorisation. As noted above, 
the success or failure of such empirical arguments for neo-Whorfianism is not my concern. 
The relevance to the present argument is that these cases provide a significant validation of 
41 See the discussion of the patient LEW in Roberson et al. ([1999]). It is not unusual for patients with visual 
deficits as measured by performance on explicit tasks to perform relatively normally on implicit tasks. Nijboer 
([2007], pp. 144-145) notes related findings in blindsight, object agnosia, and prosopagnosia. 
39 
 
                                                        
the pivotal dissociative possibility discussed in the previous Section involving total NCP for 
colour. Although MP meets the official standard for CP assumed in this paper, her radically 
impaired performance on explicit categorisation tasks suggests that she lacks just about every 
other ability usually associated with CP for colour. Such subjects thus come extremely close 
to the sort of dissociation between constitutive colour vision abilities and CP envisaged in the 
case of NONCAT. It is certainly no stretch to imagine a subject just like MP also failing 
implicit tests for CP, which would suffice to establish the relevant possibility. Despite the 
apparent strangeness, then, perhaps the scenario involving NONCAT is not as distant as one 
initially might think. 
 
5. Conclusion 
I have motivated and implemented a constitutive approach to understanding colour vision. 
The constitutive approach seeks to understand colour vision qua psychological kind, as 
opposed to a primarily phenomenological or experiential phenomenon. I proposed colour 
constancy as a core constitutive condition on colour vision. Constancy in turn was explicated 
via DV as a discriminatory, yet fully representational, capacity. I then argued that the 
possession of CP for colour, a pervasive and vivid feature of ordinary visual experience, is 
not implied by the possession of these constitutive discriminatory abilities. In sum, colour 
vision does not by its nature confer the ability to see colours in a natural, categorically 
committed, sense. This claim was further motivated by evidence of closely related 
dissociations in cognitive neuropsychology. As is often the case, the unexpected actual 
extends our knowledge as to what is possible. Such cases confirm that our ordinary 
experience of colour possesses a latent complexity that is obscured by ordinary experiential, 
introspective, approaches to understanding colour vision. 
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Many issues deserving of extended discussion inevitably have been omitted or passed 
over too briefly. One issue of outstanding importance concerns the implications of the 
constitutive approach for colour ontology. If my argument is sound, then the ability visually 
to represent categorical colour properties such as red and green is not part of the constitutive 
nature of our colour vision abilities. Somewhat paradoxically, this suggests that colour 
ontology similarly will be free of the properties that we ordinarily describe simply as the 
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